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An Introduction and Commentary:
Revisiting the Role of Liberal Trade
Policy in Promoting Idealistic Objectives
of the International Legal Order
ROBERT L. McGEORGE*

INTRODUCTION

One of the principal objectives of academic conferences and
symposia is to stimulate thinking, analysis and research by scholars
with common interests. Ideally, that process continues long after the
last session ends and the participants return home. The international
trade conference that the Northern Illinois College of Law and
American Society of International Law co-sponsored in the fall of
1993 and this symposium issue provide tangible evidence that academic
symposia sometimes achieve that objective.
In October of 1991, Rodolphe de Seife delivered a paper at an
American Society of International Law/Ford Foundation regional
international law conference that we presented at the University of
Nebraska, entitled "International Trade at a Crossroads: The Role of
International Law and International Institutions in the Post Uruguay
Round Era."' As Professor de Seife was kind enough to stay over in
Lincoln the following Saturday, we had an opportunity to continue
our discussions on some of the ideas that were presented at the
conference. Although our conversations initially rambled from one
topic to the next without much order, we eventually recognized our
common interest in international trade policy at two critical junctures
in recent history-the immediate post-World War II years in which
international idealism briefly flourished, and the post-Cold War era.
Assistant Professor of Law and Agricultural Economics, University of
ReNebraska-Lincoln; Executive Director, Center for International Trade Policy.
Research
Summer
search for this article was made possible by a Ross McCollum
Grant.
1. The proceedings were published at 71 NEB. L. REv. 365 (1992).
*
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The period of international idealism began in 1944 when the
Allied Powers realized that they would eventually prevail over the
Axis Powers in World War II, and began planning an idealistic, yet
pragmatic, vision of the post-World War II international legal order.
The architects of that legal order created relatively powerful international institutions, most notably the United Nations, World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, to promote their objectives. By 1948,
however, the allies had split into two factions, separated by the "Iron
Curtain."
After the Cold War intervened, the same nations that had created
two of the planned triad of international economic institutions rejected
the sister institution-the International Trade Organization ("ITO")that was to have responsibility for regulating post-war international
trade and commercial policy. Instead, they were content to rely upon
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 2-a provisional agreement administered by the parties themselves, rather than
a true institution, that originally was intended to address only a
narrow range of tariff issues until the delegates completed the process
of drafting and amending the ITO charter.
Understandably, international trade scholars have focused most
of their attention on trade issues that arose during the Cold War era.
GATT was pressed into service as the primary agreement to regulate
international trade in the non-Communist world when the Cold War
began, and the agenda for its most recent round of multilateral trade
negotiations was set before the Cold War ended. But, with the end
of the Cold War, the international community has an opportunity to
revisit and perhaps rekindle the international idealism that disappeared
with the advent of the Cold War.
Revisiting international trade law and policy in the context of the
international idealism of the immediate post-World War II period
does not mean that we can or should pick up where we left off in
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 639, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Protocol of Provisional Application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 4 U.S.T. 687, 55 U.N.T.S.
308. Since 1947, GATT has grown to include an interlocking series of over 100
agreements, tariff schedules, protocols and codes of conduct. The following trade
terminology is used in this article: the terms "GATT" and the "GATT system" in
this articles refers to these documents collectively; the term "General Agreement"
refers to the thirty-eight articles of the initial GATT agreement, as amended; the
term "Contracting Parties" (with initial capitals) refers to the signatories to the
General Agreement when acting formally as a body; and the term "contracting
parties" (without capitals) refers to the signatories when acting in their individual
capacities.
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1948. The world has changed in ways that the architects of the postWorld War II international order could not have anticipated in the
mid-1940s. Hence, if we are to explore the opportunities for moving
beyond the limits imposed on international trade law and policy by
the Cold War, we should learn as much as we can about the vision
for international economic relations that the allies shared before the
Cold War blurred the vision.
As Professor de Seife and I talked, we realized that some of the
younger lawyers and economists who had been involved in the formation of that vision and the creation of post-World War II international institutions in the mid-1940s might be available to provide a
first-hand account of that period, as well as valuable insights into the
envisioned role of international trade policy in promoting the ultimate
objectives of that international order. If we could find people who
were present at the birth of the post-World War II international order,
as well as scholars who were interested in exploring newly-emerging
trade issues, we thought we would have the foundation for a conference that had the potential to make important contributions in
exploring post-Cold War trade issues.
Eventually, we found two individuals who surpassed all of our
expectations. Dr. Raymond Mikesell, Professor Emeritus at the University of Oregon's Department of Economics, and William Diebold,
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Council on Foreign Relations, not only
had the first-hand professional experience that we had hoped to find,
but both had remained active scholars in the field for the past five
decades. The transcripts of their oral presentations at the conference
provide an important historical record for trade scholars. Other
articles in this symposium issue explore current trade issues from a
variety of perspectives.
I would like to add a relatively brief commentary on some of the
issues that arise as we revisit the allies' idealistic vision of the postWorld War II international economic order.
II.

A

BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

When we refer to the international idealism or vision of the
architects of the post-World War II international order, we should
not be misled into thinking that they were theoreticians who were
disinterested in real world problems or the advancement of national
interests. They were pragmatic people who had lived through the most
horrific war in the world's history, and had learned the lessons of
history.
The architects of the post-World War II international order did
not have to go back very far in time to learn the crucial lessons of
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history. World War I was supposed to be the war that ended all wars;
but it resumed only twenty years later-with a minor shuffling of the
belligerents in the opposing coalitions, and a geometric increase in
combat and civilian casualties. With the development of nuclear
weapons, it was obvious that the world could not afford a replay of
the interregnum between the past two world wars. As a result, the
architects of the post-World War II international order shared one
central objective-to eliminate or at least reduce the tensions that had
led to war on a global scale in the past.
They invested the United Nations with primary responsibility for
maintaining the peace. During the interregnum between the two world
watrs, the victorious allies created a somewhat similar international
institution-the League of Nations. Learning from their failures, the
architects of the post-World War II international order, invested the
United Nations with substantially greater peacekeeping powers and a
broader mission.
The most obvious difference between the two institutions is the
United Nations' authority to deter aggression that threatens the peace.
The United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council to take
all necessary measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security including: compelling members to adopt measures not involving the use of force, such as interrupting economic relations, air
service and diplomatic relations;3 employing air, sea or land forces to
maintain blockades; 4 and applying direct military force.'
The Charter also recognizes that maintaining the peace requires
attention to matters beyond the traditional boundaries of diplomacy
and military affairs. In order to create "conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations," the Charter directs the United Nations to promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems; and international cultural and educational
cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion.6
3. U.N.

CHARTER, art. 41.
4. Id. at art. 42.
5. Id. at arts. 43-50.

6. Id. at art. 55.
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The United Nations system includes a number of specialized
agencies whose mission is to promote friendly relations among nations
through cooperation on economic, social, cultural, health and scientific endeavors. These agencies include: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the World Intellectual
Property Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization;
the Universal Postal Union; the International Maritime Organization;
and the International Labor Organization.
Some of the most prominent failures in the inter-war period
occurred in the areas of economic development, monetary and trade
policy. During the first decade of this period, disparate levels of
economic performance exacerbated frictions among the former and
future adversaries. The United States economy boomed, for example,
while Germany suffered from runaway inflation and a general disintegration of its economy. By the second decade of this period,
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, initiated by the United States with its
Smoot-Hawley tariffs, and exacerbated by successive rounds of tariff
rate escalations, currency manipulations and other forms of protectionism, had turned a national recession into a deep worldwide
depression.
The failures in economic development, monetary and trade policy
may not have been the principal causes of World War IT. But, the
architects of the post-World War II international order realized that
they had exacerbated other tensions in relations among the principal
belligerents in World War I, and contributed to the resumption of
world war.7 Accordingly, the Western allies-led by the United States
and Great Britain- envisioned an important role for international
economic cooperation and interdependence in building the mutual
8
confidence on which the peace depends.
The allies convened a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 to plan the post-World War II international economic
order. At that conference, they promptly laid the groundwork for
two relatively powerful international institutions to implement their
international economic development and monetary policies. By most
accounts, both Bretton Woods institutions-the World Bank, which
7. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
discussion of the inter-war period.

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM

39 (1981) for a good

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR
EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, 79 COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 1-2

8. See

(Nov. 1945) (hereinafter cited as "U.S. Proposal"); Harry C. Hawkins, The Importance of International Commerce to Prosperity (Worldwide Broadcasting Foundation
radio broadcast, Apr. 2, 1944) transcribedin UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2104, 74

COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES

3 (Apr. 1944).
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is responsible for providing capital to Less Developed Countries
("LDCs") for economic development projects, and the International
Monetary Fund, which is responsible for stabilizing currency exchange
rates-have fulfilled their intended roles in the international economic

order. 9

A different scenario unfolded for the "third pillar in the institutional structure of specialized agencies" to promote post-war economic cooperation and reconstruction. 0 In 1946, the United States
(in consultation with the British) submitted a draft charter for an
International Trade Organization ("ITO") that would be responsible
for regulating international trade and related commercial and labor
matters. Thereafter, delegates from approximately fifty countries
amended the proposed charter in international conferences held in
London, New York, Geneva and Havana between 1946 and 1948."1
While negotiations for the ITO charter continued, a smaller group
of delegates from twenty-seven nations agreed to reduce import duties
at a Geneva tariff conference in 1947. To ensure that the agreed-upon
tariff concessions were not undercut by other trade-distorting measures, the delegates incorporated the commercial provisions of the
draft ITO charter, and entered into a protocol of provisional acceptance of the resulting document-the General Agreement. They assumed that the General Agreement would be incorporated into the
final ITO charter the following year.' 2
By 1948, however, when the delegates met in Havana to work
out the final details of the ITO charter, the Cold War had intervened,
and the United States' enthusiasm for international institutions waned.
As a result, the third pillar that had been envisioned to support an
interconnected structure of international economic institutions never
made it off the drawing board. By necessity, the General Agreement,
which the delegates intended to serve as a provisional agreement for
one year, became the only multilateral trade agreement available to
promote the trade objectives of the envisioned post-World War II
international order.
The international institutions that the allies created during the
brief period of international idealism survived, and in some cases
9. For a good discussion of the Bretton Woods institutions, see Sisters in the
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 7.
10. OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM 1 (1987).
11. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 10-13 (1970).
12. Id.

Wood, THE
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flourished, during the Cold War. The International Monetary Fund
and World Bank played their intended roles in promoting economic
development and stable currency exchange rates by avoiding conflicts
with the Communist bloc-largely by excluding and ignoring it. The
U.N. Security Council did not have that luxury with the Soviet Union
as one of its permanent members-other than the notable exception
when it voted to resist North Korea's invasion of South Korea, while
the Soviet Union boycotted Security Council sessions in support of
the Peoples Republic of China's claim to the Chinese seat on the
council. Despite the conflicts between the superpowers on the Security
Council, the United Nations achieved a respectable record of accomplishment by expanding the role of the General Assembly, assembling
peacekeeping forces to monitor cease fire agreements among combatants who were ready to abandon the use of force, and encouraging
relatively non-controversial cooperation in scientific, cultural, economic and social fields.
When the Cold War ended, the international institutions had the
organizational structures and missions in place that allowed them to
achieve the full potential intended for them in the mid-1940s. The
World Bank and International Monetary Fund have admitted former
members of the former Communist bloc that have adopted free market
reforms, and provided financial assistance to support their reform
efforts. Probably the best example of the United Nations transition
to its envisioned role is the Security Council's record of adopting
trade embargoes in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and its
eventual authorization of the use of force to dislodge Iraq from the
territory that it had conquered.
III.

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY
AFTER THE COLD WAR

Most of our scholarship and policy debates in the international
trade field focus on issues of national economic welfare. Typically,
in our broadest inquiries, we may weigh the financial benefits promised by Smith, Ricardo, Heckscher, Ohlin, Samuelson, Vernon and
other international economists when we reward comparative advantage
and economic efficiency against the policy arguments that favor
adopting trade-distorting policies to retaliate against unfair trade
practices (e.g., the imposition of countervailing and anti-dumping
duties), protect infant or declining industries that need temporary help
to survive fierce import competition, or serve important non-economic
national interests (e.g., protecting national security or prohibiting
nationals from bribing foreign officials as a means of obtaining
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business). Or, we may debate whether we should divert a portion of
the gains of liberalized trade policies to assist firms, workers and
communities that suffer from increased import competition.
We should not lose sight of the fact that increasing national
standards of living, as important as that objective may be, is not the
ultimate end of liberal trade policy. It is a means to an end, or more
correctly to several ends.
The architects of the post-World War II international order
envisioned liberal trade policy as one of several means to preserving
the peace and avoiding a World War III. The United States proposal
for an ITO recognized the relationship between liberal trade policies
and the overriding objective of that international order when it states
that: "The experience of cooperation in the task of earning a living
promotes both the habit and techniques of common effort and helps
make permanent the mutual confidence on which peace depends."' 3
Moreover, by promoting the economic interdependence that results
from encouraging specialization in order to fully exploit comparative
advantages, it is less likely that nations will engage in hostilities that
impose obvious costs in converting to more costly domestic substitutes,
and threaten the supply of vital goods.
In the post-Cold War era, I believe that we can best rekindle the
international idealism of the immediate post-World War II era, not
by attempting to take up where we left off in 1948, but by ensuring
that liberal trade policy is a means of achieving the ultimate international objectives of today. My thoughts on linkages between liberal
trade policy and the essential objectives of a post-Cold War era have
to be preliminary. Many of the rules and doctrines of international
law that served us well during the international idealism of the mid1940s and survived the Cold War, seem to be unraveling as we
confront post-Cold War challenges, but the international community
is far from reaching a consensus on how to respond. Nonetheless, I
believe there are at least three ultimate objectives in the post-Cold
War era that liberal trade policy should promote.
A.

POTENTIAL RIVALRY AMONG REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS

The first area of concern is one that the architects of the postWorld War II international order clearly recognized-the establishment of regional trading blocs. The General Agreement reflects some
of the ambiguity posed by free trade agreements, customs unions and
other regional trading blocs for liberal trade policy.
13. U.S. Proposal, supra note 8, at 1.
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Regional trading agreements contradict one of the basic foundations of the GATT system-the Most Favored Nation ("MFN")
standard. At a minimum, all forms of these agreements eventually
eliminate tariffs among member countries, substituting a two-tier
system for the single MFN standard. Most contracting parties qualify
for MFN tariff rates, while members of the trading bloc receive betterthan-most-favored-nation treatment.
Despite this contradiction of a basic GATT principle, the General
Agreement explicitly permits free trade agreements and customs unions;
and the Contracting Parties have not prohibited more comprehensive
forms of international economic integration such as Western Europe's
progression from a common market to an economic community, and
after Maastricht to an economic union. This uneasy coexistence
between a multilateral trade agreement based on MFN treatment, and
a diverse array of regional free trade agreements, customs unions,
common markets, economic communities and economic unions seems
to be based upon two factors.
First, on a somewhat theoretical level, we must acknowledge that
regional trading blocs are more successful in achieving liberal trade
policies than GATT or any other widely accepted multilateral agreement. Although some imports may be diverted from non-members to
fellow members of the regional trade agreement, the agreement usually
increases the total volume of international trade. Moreover, regional
trade agreements often promote liberal international economic policies
in sectors of the economy beyond the scope of the General Agreeprotection for
ment-including trade in services, agricultural trade,
14
intellectual property rights and foreign investment.
Second, as a practical matter, the General Agreement minimizes
the adverse impacts of regional trade agreements on non-members. It
reduces the diversionary impact of regional trade agreements by
prohibiting members from increasing their external trade barriers for
contracting parties who are not members of those agreements, and
requires them to pay compensation to non-members for any losses
occasioned by the establishment of the trading bloc."'
As long as regional trading blocs and GATT's multilateral system
remain vigorous trade regimes that actively promote both their liberal
14. The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), for example,
liberalizes trade in all of these areas. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, 31 I.L.M. 289; 31 I.L.M. 605.
15. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIV.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

trade objectives and the ultimate goals of an enlightened international
order, they should continue to coexist without any serious problems.
If at some point in the future, however, the regional trading blocs
thrive, while GATT's multilateral system becomes moribund as a
result of the inability of an organization with over one hundred
contracting parties to adapt to new challenges, our tolerance of
exceptions to GATT's MFN principle may pose serious problems.
In part, the problems with this scenario are economic in nature.
No regional trading bloc, no matter how carefully its members are
selected to provide a range of comparative advantages in all relevant
factors of production, could attain the economic potential of a
worldwide trade system. Moreover, it is likely that many LDCs, which
are already marginalized in the world trade system, would be excluded
from any of the major trading blocs.
More importantly, however, under this situation we could predict
a situation that would look hauntingly familiar to the architects of
the post-World War II international order. It does not take much
imagination to foresee the possibility of a world with three dominant
regional trading blocs-a European bloc led by Germany, a Western
Hemispheric bloc led by the United States, and an Asian bloc led by
Japan. In this scenario, we might also envision much weaker trading
blocs composed of former Soviet Republics or groups of LDCs.
At that point, three of the most formidable belligerents of World
War II would lead rival trading blocs-while Russia once again would
defy attempts to predict its behavior. In total disregard for the role
of international trade in maintaining peace by promoting worldwide
economic cooperation and interdependence, we could have a world in
which trade policy encourages economic rivalry among regional blocs.
I do not suggest that we maintain the balance between a multilateral trade system and regional trade agreements by curtailing the
right of regional trading blocs to move toward liberal trade objectives
at a faster pace. Instead, we have to ensure that the multilateral trade
system does not lag too far behind.
This may mean that we should revisit the original idea of establishing a true international institution to implement international trade
law and policy, with a permanent structure and dispute resolution
procedures that cannot be blocked by dissenting parties-along the
lines of the proposed ITO charter. The provisions of the Uruguay
Round that would establish a World Trade Organization ("WTO")
appear to represent an important step in this direction. After some
experience with the WTO, however, the Contracting Parties should
consider whether the logical next step is to create the true international
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institution envisioned by the architects of the post-World War II
international order.
B. RISE OF NATIONALISM AND SECESSIONISM

At the end of World War II, the principal peacekeeping objective
was to ensure that frictions among the superpowers did not trigger
World War III. Despite the advent of the Cold War, we somehow
managed to avoid world war; and with its apparent end, world war
in the immediate future seems unlikely.
The architects of the post-World War II international order also
proclaimed the right of all people to self-determination. They spoke
of that right in rather abstract terms in the Purposes and Principals
section of the United Nations Charter 16 and other provisions throughout that document. Later sources of international law attempted to
determine which peoples are entitled to establish their own state if
they so desire. The General Assembly's "Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
' 7
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, '
which is considered to be an authoritative codification of existing
rules of customary law, unambiguously extends the right of selfdetermination to inhabitants of colonies that have a status separate
from the territory of administering states. 8 In a later section of the
same document, however, the General Assembly declared that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour. '9

That left minority populations in multi-ethnic states without the
right to create their own state. International law guaranteed them
16. One of the purposes of the organization is "to develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples . . ." U.N. CHARTER, supra note 3, at art. 1:2.
17. G.A. Res. 2625, G.A.O.R., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121; reprinted in
9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) (hereinafter cited as "G.A. Res. 2625").
18. Id.
19. Id.
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only the right, in community with other members of their ethnic,
religious or linguistic minority, "to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion... [and] to use their own language." 20
At most, they might have the right under international law to disrupt
the territorial integrity of the existing state by creating a secessionist
state if their government denies them equal rights without distinction
2
as to race, creed or colour. '
Admittedly, this solution to the self-determination issue accepted
arbitrary and unjust suppressions of the right of self-determination in
the past in order to achieve stability in the post-World War II
international order. That stability resulted from freezing international
boundary lines as they existed shortly after the end of World War II,
with the obvious exception of mutually-agreeable boundary adjust22

ments.

To be sure, the architects of the post-World War II international
order promised independence to colonial people. But, that did not
require any changes in international boundary lines. They recognized
the right of people living within the boundaries of colonies-no matter
how arbitrarily the colonialists might have drawn those borders-to
exercise their rights of self-determination by creating their own states
within the colonial borders.
At the same time, the states in existence at the end of World
War II obtained grandfather rights to their boundaries, precluding
self-determination claims of minority peoples within their borders.
Regardless of the methods used in the past to acquire that territory,
the self-determination rights of Hawaiians in the United States, Kurds
in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey and Scots in the United Kingdom did
not include a right to secede in order to create their own state.
This solution to the self-determination dilemma worked reasonably well throughout the immediate post-World War II and Cold War
eras. Reflecting the stability that resulted from this policy, one would
find no significant changes in the international boundary lines drawn
on a world globe produced in 1945 and a current globe. Changes in
the names of states within those boundaries would abound, but the
boundary lines would stay in virtually the same place.
With the end of the Cold War, we face a resurgence in nationalism, a rejection of existing international borders by insurrectionist
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
21. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 17.

22. A recent example of a voluntary secession is the division of Czechoslovakia

into the Czech and Slovak Republics.
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and irredentist movements, and consequently a more complicated
threat to the peace than the one that existed at the end of World War
II. The collapses of the Soviet and Yugoslav empires have released
long-suppressed nationalist fears and claims, ethnic and religious
tensions and demands for self-determination in the form of secessionist states. Combined with pre-existing and newly-awakened nationalist
movements in other parts of the world, hundreds if not thousands of
active nationalist movements currently demand their own states or
substantially greater political autonomy. 2a Self-determination movements in former Communist countries range from the conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina that dominate the front pages of our newspapers
to geographic regions of the former Soviet Union that few of us could
find on our maps-for example, South Ossetia (Georgia), the selfproclaimed Dneister Republic (Moldova), Chechen-Ingushetia (Russia)
and Transcarpathia (Ukraine). Outside the former Communist world,
self-determination movements actively seek the creation of new secessionist states on almost all continents-for example, the Tuareg
movement in Mali; the independence movements in the Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Punjab regions of India; the Tibetan demands
for the restoration of its independence from China; and the Kurdish
and Shia demands for independence from Iraq. Closer to home, there
are active separatist movements in Quebec and Puerto Rico. 24
In the post-Cold War era, the main threat to international peace
may be posed initially by armed conflicts among relatively small
states, based on their geographic size, economy or military potential.
Unfortunately, history suggests that the chaos and instability that
inevitably accompanies nationalist movements' use of armed force to
acquire territory and redraw international boundaries can escalate into
serious international breaches of the peace. 25 Two examples should
illustrate current potential threats to the maintenance of international
peace.
If Serbian 26 armed forces or local ethnic Serb militias attempt to
duplicate their success in Bosnia by creating secessionist states within
Macedonia that are geographically contiguous with Serbia, we may
23. The appendix in MORTON HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE
123-60 (1992) includes a non-comprehensive survey of over one
hundred self-determination movements as of mid-1992.
24. Id.
25. World War I, which started as a conflict between Serbia and BosniaHerzegovina, is a good example.
26. Serbia is the dominant republic in what remains of Yugoslavia, along with
NEW WORLD ORDER

Montenegro.
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see a rerun on the Balkan Wars of the early part of this century,
rather than the Bosnian conflict. It has become apparent that no
nations outside the immediate region are prepared to intervene militarily in Bosnia to deal with the conflict between ethnic Muslims,
Serbians and Croats. The lessons of the Balkan Wars, however,
suggest that countries such as Greece, Turkey, Albania and Bulgariaas well as Serbia-with frustrated historic claims to Macedonia, or
concern for ethnic populations within the country, may feel compelled
to intervene to protect their interests. Among other consequences,
that presents the possibility of two NATO members-Greece and
Ttrkey-on opposite sides of an armed conflict.
It is reasonable to suspect that irredentist movements in other
countries have been encouraged by Serbia's success in bringing majority Serb populations into a geographically contiguous Greater
Serbia-whether in the form of an expanded Yugoslav state or a Serbdominated Yugoslavia surrounded by a contiguous ring nominally
independent Serb-controlled states carved out of neighboring republics. Taking one example, irredentist movements in Hungary may be
encouraged to use armed force to redraw the borders of Slovakia,
Yugoslavia and Romania in order to bring large concentrations of
ethnic Hungarians in those countries within a Greater Hungary. Of
course, as in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing would be necessary in order to
expel other ethnic groups from those areas and to create corridors to
link up enclaves into a contiguous geographic unit.
Ironically, liberal trade policy may deserve some of the blame
(or credit) for this new wave of nationalism and secessionism. In the
absence of a liberal international trade regime, which allows a nation
to export the products for which it enjoys a comparative advantage
and earn the foreign currency to import the products for which it
suffers a comparative disadvantage, it must become economically selfsufficient. And, economic self-sufficiency usually requires a relatively
large amount of territory in order to obtain the variety of terrains,
climates and natural resources to become reasonably efficient in the
production of essential agricultural and industrial goods-even if that
means finding ways to live together in multi-ethnic states. With a
liberal international trade regime, however, nations that could never
hope to become economically self-sufficient on their own can thrive.
Singapore presents an extreme example of the dependence of
small states on the maintenance of a liberal international trade regime.
Almost three million Singaporeans live on an island of 622 square
kilometers (about three and a half times the size of the District of
Columbia). It has virtually no mineral resources, and only about
eleven percent of its land is suitable for agricultural production. In
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the absence of a liberal international trade regime, its economic
prospects would be bleak at best. But with such a liberal system in
place, and Singapore's strategic location along major international
trade routes, its citizens earn a per capita income of almost $14,000
by importing virtually all of their food and natural resources and
exporting manufactured products and services. In fact, the value of
both its imports and exports exceeds its Gross Domestic Product by
27
a comfortable margin.
Serbia provides a negative example of the dependence of relatively
small states on the maintenance of a liberal international trade regime.
United Nations sanctions have not only devastated its economy, but
it also appears that they have been successful in encouraging the
Serbian leadership to cease (or at least greatly diminish) its military
28
.and economic support of the ethnic Serb militias in Bosnia.
The first step for the international community in responding to
the nationalist and secessionist threat to peace in the post-Cold War
era is to reaffirm the existing rules of international law on the lawful
exercise of self-determination rights, or to adapt those rules to new
realities if the old rules have become obsolete. Fortunately, a number
of scholars have been rethinking these issues and contributing valuable
insights to this debate. 29 Until the international community adopts
different principles, however, we should continue to accept and
enforce the principle that when the international community recognizes the existence of a state (primarily by the process of admitting it
to the United Nations), and the government represents the whole
people of the state without distinction as to race, creed or color, it
acknowledges the right of that state to maintain its territorial integrity.3 0
The second step is to ensure that international trade policy serves
as a means to the end of maintaining the peace in the post-Cold War
27. All of these statistics
1993 307-08 (1993).
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28. I realize the danger of citing events occurring in the midst of fluid,
contemporary situation as support for any proposition. By the time this article
appears in print, the role of the Yugoslav government in the Bosnian conflict may
change several times. If it reverts to the more bellicose position that it exhibited when

the conflict began, we could substitute other examples-such as the role of the
international trade embargo in convincing the South African government to accept
majority rule.
29. See HALPERIN, supra note 23; Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and
World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAMiE L. REV. 1287 (1991); GORDON GOTLIEB, NATION
AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF
SOVEREIGNTY (1993).
30. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 17.
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international order. This means that leaders of unlawful secessionist
movements should never be able to assume that they will be able to
create an economically viable secessionist state enjoying the benefits
of a liberal trade regime after they achieve their military objectives.
In fact, the international community should operate on the general
principle that secessionist movements that employ armed force to
achieve their objectives in violation of the rules of international law
are not eligible for membership in GATT or regional trading blocs.
The same principle should be applied to states that provide unlawful
military support for illegal secessionist movements or annex the
territory gained by those movements. Depending upon the severity of
the situation, the international community might find it appropriate
to go beyond those measures by maintaining total or partial trade
embargoes.
o
By suggesting that international trade law and policy in the postCold War international order should serve the ends of maintaining
the international peace when it is challenged by unlawful secessionist
and irredintist movements, I do not mean to suggest that economics
is a major consideration when soldiers in ethnic militias decide to
subject their neighbors to ethnic cleansing campaigns. But, their
political leaders may be less likely to resort to the use of armed force
in order to achieve their political objectives if they understand that
they will achieve a Pyrrhic victory if they are successful-in the form
of a non-viable national economy.
C.

RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

International environmentalists have developed a respectable
agreement for the proposition that the current international legal
order includes at least one additional ultimate objective in addition
to the peacekeeping objective-the right of all people to live in a
viable global environment that will be preserved for future generations
through sustainable economic development practices." Just as international trade law and policy must play an important role in promoting the peacekeeping objectives of the international order, it should
31. For a brief summary of the history of the movement to recognize the
human right to adequate levels of environmental quality, see Melissa Throme,
Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301,
303-05 (1991). A small sample of publications on the subject includes: Louis B. Sohn,

The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1982); EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENER-

(1989); W. Paul Gormley, The Right to a Safe Environment, 28
L. 1 (1988); Iveta Hodkova, Is There a Right to a Healthy
Environment in the International Legal Order?, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 65, 69-77.
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play a positive role in disciplining unsustainable development practices
that threaten the ability of the eco-system to support economic
development for current or future generations.
The goal of sustainable economic development should not cause
any major conflicts between international environmental and trade
policies. Advocates of liberal trade policy should be just as concerned
as environmentalists about environmentally-harmful and unsustainable production methods that confer unfair cost advantages upon
producers who do not bear the full cost of satisfying minimum
international environmental standards. As noted by Arthur Dunkel,
GATT's former Director-General: "Trade is not an end in itself;
rather, it is a means to an end. The end is environmentally sustainable
economic development."32
Even though the basic objectives of liberal trade and international
environmental policy should be complimentary, in some cases current
rules of international trade and environmental law conflict with each
other. Some countries adopt facially-neutral national health and safety
standards that operate as disguised, and very effective, non-tarifftrade barriers. The GATT panel decision in the Tuna/Dolphin case"
raises serious questions concerning the compatibility of GATT's trade
rules with the trade bans that are employed by widely-accepted
international environmental treaties, such as the Stockholm
Convention3 4 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora," and the United States'
legislation, such as the Marine Mammal Protection Act,3 6 that impose
mandatory trade bans to enforce their environmental standards. There
is no consensus on whether countervailing duties may be imposed to
offset the cost advantages enjoyed by producers that are not required
by their governments to observe minimum international environmental
standards. 3
32. As reported in Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partnersin
J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
33. GATT Panel, United States - Report on Imports of Tuna, (Aug. 16,
1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594.
34. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 reprinted in l1 I.L.M. 1416.
35. 27 U.S.T. 1087.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-77 (1988).
37. 1 have suggested several means of harmonizing the legitimate objectives of
the international trade, environmental and economic development communities in an
article that will be published by the Wisconsin International Law Journal in the near
Sustainable Development: A Commentary, 86 AM.

future.
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If international trade law and policy is to become a means of
promoting the acknowledged end of environmentally-sustainable economic development, representatives of the international trade and
environmental communities need to work together to develop a harmonized body of international trade and environmental law. Although
GATT's Contracting Parties just finished an exhausting seven year
round of negotiations, their trade negotiators should begin planning
for a "Green Round" after they take a well-deserved break.
CONCLUSION

All of these proposals are subject to attack by those who believe
that "we should not mix trade with politics." The attacks usually
become more vigorous if those who advocate mixing trade with politics
let it slip that they have an idealistic streak in their political objectives.
As we revisit the idealism of the immediate post-World War II era,
however, we should be reminded of two important points.
First, the architects of the post-World War II international order
were eminently pragmatic when they resolved to establish policies and
build institutions to maintain international peace and avoid a third
world war. The architects of the post-Cold War international order
must be just as pragmatic in identifying and advancing the crucial
international political objectives of this era-even if they run the risk
of being labeled idealists.
Moreover, the architects of the current liberal trade system
designed it to play an important role in promoting the overriding
political objective of the post-World War II international order.
Liberal international trade policy never has been, and never should
be, concerned only with economic gain. Instead, we should ensure
that it plays a positive role in promoting the overriding international
objectives of the post-Cold War era.

